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This paper explores the challenge that the experience of third-person perspective recall 
(i.e. observer memories) presents to a phenomenological theory of memory. Specifically 
this paper outlines what husserl describes as the necessary features of recollection, 
among which he includes the givenness of objects in the first person perspective. 
The paper notes that, on first sight, these necessary features cannot account for the 
experience of observer memories as described by Neisser & Nigro (1983). This paper 
proposes that observer memories do not so much entail a shift of perspective as they 
do a process of self-objectification and as such do not break with the phenomenological 
emphasis on the first person perspective.
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the philosophical questions that we pose about consciousness today are 
inextricably linked to questions concerning perspective. Whatever is 
conscious is thought to experience the world from its own first-person 
perspective. yet, is it reasonable to speak of conscious experiences 
from a third-person perspective? We speak often enough of adopting 
other perspectives but does such talk have any philosophic or scientific 
weight? cognitive psychologists ulric neisser and georgia nigro famously 
investigated perspective in memory and made a distinction between 
observer memories and field memories (Nigro & Neisser 1983). Field 
memories are recollections from the first-person point of view. Thus, when 
we remember, we re-experience the event from the original perspective 
we had when we first witnessed it. According to Neisser and Nigro, there 
are also memories where we are spectators of ourselves. they call these 
observer memories and claim that they are recollections from the third-
person perspective. the person recollecting sees his or herself from the 
outside, participating in some event or other. the authors describe the 
distinction between the two forms of memory as a difference of vantage 
point (ibid., pp. 467-469).
this form of memory seems to pose a problem to philosophers who 
insist that the first-person perspective is a necessary feature of mental 
phenomena. Husserl is perhaps the thinker of the first-person perspective 
par excellence and we may wonder if new empirical findings upset Husserl’s 
phenomenological account of memory, since he held there was apodictic 
evidence that the first-person perspective characterizes all conscious 
experience. indeed, cognitive scientists have found that there are several 
factors that motivate a change of perspective in memory. neisser and nigro 
point to the purpose, emotional quality, and level of self-awareness of a 
memory determining whether it will have the field or observer perspective 
(ibid., pp. 481-482). other studies have shown that aging has an impact on 
the frequency of observer memories (Piolino et al. 2002) and there is some 
agreement that observer memories are re-constructions of past events 
rather than copies of them (on the ‘construction’ model of memory, see 
conway & Pleydell-Pearce 2000). the aim of this paper is to investigate 
the challenges and opportunities that this form of recollection offers to 
husserl’s phenomenological analyses of memory and to decide whether 
oBseRveR MeMoRIes AnD PHenoMenoLogy




observer memories offer insuperable obstacles for intentional analysis.
Phenomenological research into recollection consists in the attempt to determine 
the intentional structure of the conscious experience of remembering, i.e. the 
way that the mind refers to or is ‘about’ transcendent objects when it remembers 
them. it also consists in determining the structures of remembered objects with 
respect to their thinkability, i.e. the conditions of their possible experience. When 
it comes to the analysis of intentional experiences, husserl claims that what is 
directly revealed in reflection may not be enough and that a comparison within 
reflection is often necessary (Hua XIX/1, pp. 462)1. in his lectures on inner time-
consciousness husserl compares and contrasts recollection with perception. 
Perception and recollection have roughly the same temporal structure – they 
both have a privileged now-phase, they both have running-off phases. For 
example, whether i hear or remember a melody, the experience has a unity and 
flow in duration; the past notes do not completely disappear and the current note 
is fresh. in recollection there is a temporal present, a now, but it is a remembered, 
re-presented now that has elapsed. thus, there is a discrepancy between the now 
that i recollect and the now in which i recollect, unlike perception where there is 
simultaneity between the perceived object and the perception’s execution (hua X, 
pp. 40-45).
to clarify this talk of discrepancy and simultaneity, we should note husserl’s 
distinction between intentional consciousness and inner consciousness. 
intentional consciousness refers to acts that mean transcendent objects in 
different ways, e.g. perception, phantasy, signification. Inner consciousness is 
a pre-reflective self-experiencing – a self-awareness that the ego has of its own 
intentional activity. it is the non-explicit awareness that i own the copyright 
on the activities and sufferings of my consciousness. the traditional term is 
apperception. through perception i experience external objects, but i also 
experience the act of perception immanently in inner consciousness. When 
perceiving some object it is given to me as being vividly now and the act of 
perception is also given to me apperceptively (pre-reflectively) as being now. Thus 
if i remember some object right now, i am running through an elapsed perception, 
and the object’s now-phases have already run their course. thus, there is a 
discrepancy between the object’s now and the apperceptive now in recollection, 
but for perception they are simultaneous.
1   all husserl references are to the volumes of the husserliana editions followed by the page 
number.
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this discrepancy results from the doubleness of recollection. according to 
husserl’s analyses, recollection exhibits a double intentionality (hua X, pp. 53-55, 
57-59). yet the doubleness of the intentionality does not yield a double-object. 
When i recollect, i thematically intend the object of my former perception and 
i implicitly intend that perception, which was originally experienced in inner 
consciousness. the external experience is necessarily nested in consciousness 
by means of an internal experience. the quality of ‘having been perceived’ is 
an essential determination of the recollected appearance. thus husserl says 
that recollection is constituted by a double intentionality. the act of perception 
is intentionally implied but not thematically posited in recollection, unlike the 
remembered object. For example: ‘i remember my snow-shovel’ does not mean 
‘i remember having perceived my snow-shovel’ as that would signify an act of 
reflection. It rather means ‘I see the snow-shovel as having been’. In the now the 
rememberer sees the not-now. expressed more technically, i intend the same 
object, i execute that perception again, and this ‘again’ expresses how retentions 
have modified that intentional act. Here retention refers to a phase of the living 
present that both preserves and de-presents phases of my intentional acts as they 
trail off into the past.
since recollection has a double intentionality, and intentionality 
is structured by inner time-consciousness, recollection also has a 
double flow; I experience both the initial perception’s elapsed now and 
recollection’s actual now. despite this doubleness, it belongs to one stream of 
consciousness. conscious acts like perception endure in inner consciousness 
but they also succeed each other and remembered-perceptual acts appear 
as having a certain co-ordination in that succession. husserl holds that 
recollection is an experience integrated into one conscious life by virtue of 
its determinate horizon of protentions (hua X, pp. 52-53). 
Just as intentional acts have their retentions, so they have their 
protentions, which refer to the phase of the living present that is open to 
what is coming next. Whereas the protentions of perception emptily and 
indeterminately anticipate what is coming, the protentions of memory have 
been determined. the moments that i protend in one phase of memory 
are identical with the moments i retend in a subsequent phase of memory, 
which does not hold for perception. more plainly: the next moment of 
perception is a possibility while the next moment of recollection is an 
actuality, a determinate part of my unitary, flowing conscious life. Thus, 
remembered events are posited in a temporal context. in remembering 
an object, i implicitly intend the perception with its obscure temporal 
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surroundings, which are nothing other than the moments of my life.
to sum up this sketch of the phenomenology of recollection we can say that: 
perception gives me the ‘now as now’ by virtue of the simultaneity of its object, 
the object’s presentation, and the inner awareness of that presentation. to 
reproduce an elapsed now I must bring about a modified perception, which is 
what we call recollection. the thematic focus of this recollection is the perceived 
but we also implicitly intend the perceiving. in recollection i attend to the former 
perception’s object and the object’s now, which is posited in relation to the actually 
present now2.
can phenomenologists make sense of observer memories? it seems that 
the phenomenologist would hold that recollections must in principle 
be field memories. If recollection is re-experiencing what we originally 
perceived and if perception is necessarily in the first-person perspective, 
then it should follow that recollections are in the first-person perspective. 
husserl’s analyses show that the body bears the zero point of orientation 
for perceptual exploration. the horizon of perceptual space opens up 
around me. if i move my head then there is a shift of the object – the object 
stays where it is, but it now appears more to the left in my visual field. I 
apperceive my own possibilities of movement and the profiles of the objects 
around me as being correlated. given the decisive role that the apperception 
of the body as a zero point plays in husserl’s analyses of perception, and 
given that recollection for husserl is a quasi-re-perceiving, we must ask: 
what is the zero point of observer memories? What sort of perspective 
organizes appearances in observer memories?
the phenomenologist could deny that they are really recollections. instead 
one might say that observer memories are knowledge of the past rather 
than recollections. this would then dismiss observer memories as being 
merely event-specific knowledge accompanied by confused quasi-perceptual 
elements. the strategy is not a satisfying one, given that observer memories 
appear as a species of episodic remembering rather than semantic knowing 
(on this distinction see tulving 1972).
Perhaps observer memories have a distorted self-intention. brough argues 
that husserl’s own logic dictates that recollection requires a triple, not 
double intentionality. When recollecting we intend: i) the object originally 
2  the foregoing outline is quite meagre. it only presents what is necessary for the subsequent 
analyses, leaving out the important analyses of affection, motivation, and fulfilment in memory.
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perceived in the act; ii) the perceptual act executed; and he adds iii) a past 
segment of the absolute time-constituting consciousness. to illustrate: 
i recall an object and to do so i implicitly intend the perception that 
constituted the object and to do that i even more implicitly intend the inner 
temporal experience that constituted the perception. brough says: “to 
recall the elapsed act without representing the flow through which I first 
experienced it, would be tantamount to recalling an act which belonged to 
no one” (brough 1975, pp. 60)3. We might have grounds to say that observer 
memories are recollections in which one intends an object and a perception 
but fails to properly couch those intentionalities in an intention of the 
flow that constitutes the synthetic unity of the stream of consciousness. 
We can then say that observer memories are conditioned by a distortion of 
recollection’s nested structure. the theme of self-consciousness is crucial 
but i would stress that observer memories do not have a failed self-intention 
but rather an original and peculiar form of self-intention. i propose that 
observer memories are genuine forms of recollection that involve a self-
objectification.
this theme is a vast and multifarious one. i will omit husserl’s 
considerations concerning the empirical ego as a psycho-physical reality. 
Instead, I will restrict myself exclusively to forms of self-objectification 
that speak directly to the question of perspective. i will start with a 
straightforward case of self-objectification in perception, moving on to 
inner consciousness, then, taking these together, i will attempt a sketch of 
self-objectification in observer memories.
Already in perception we grasp ourselves as objects. Specifically in touch 
there occurs a twofold apprehension: i feel the object’s tactile features and 
i feel the localization of my sensations and movements (hua iv, pp. 79-84). i 
touch the object, but i am also touched by the object, i.e. by touching objects 
i can discover objective features of my hand. even in perception my body is 
constituted for me both as a means and as a transcendent object of external 
intuition. With respect to movement, i apprehend myself as initiating 
certain movements and as suffering other movements. husserl’s famous 
distinction between leib and Körper shows how my body is constituted for 
3   this is a presentation and not an endorsement of brough’s position. an alternative view can 
be found in Zahavi (2003), who posits that the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act is nothing 
other than its temporalizing. there are great merits to this latter position but the issue of whether 
or not inner consciousness is adequately described in analyses of time-consciousness is thorny. 
brentano (2008, pp. 144-152) for one held that the apperception of one’s intentional activity 
included propositional and even affective dimensions.
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my consciousness as both a lived body and some extended matter (hua iv, 
pp. 157-160). Here self-objectification means apprehending oneself as a thing 
with its exposed surfaces and its externality to intentional animation.
this awareness of one’s body as something object-like, however, is not 
sufficient to explain the sort of self-objectification in observer memories. 
This tactile manner of self-objectification is a feature of perception 
and would as such be common to field memories insofar as they are re-
perceivings. the self-object in observer memories is unlike this basic 
tactile self-objectification in two regards. First, in observer memories I 
take a distance from that which i apprehend as my body, whereas in touch 
i merely change attitude or apprehension with respect to my body. second, 
in observer memories I apprehend my objectified self not just as a body, 
but rather as a person who i once was. observer memories are not limited 
to merely remembering objective and causal features of my self. the self-
objectification specific to observer memories requires further analysis.
returning to our theme of inner-consciousness, we note that in recollection, 
the initial perception and its object have been representationally modified, 
but what of the inner consciousness involved? husserl tells us that every 
experience is either impressional (i.e. inwardly presentational) or re-
presentational. on the one hand, husserl says that to every consciousness 
of something immanent (every impressional, inner consciousness) there 
corresponds a re-presentational consciousness of the same (to every 
sensed red there is a possible phantasmal red). on the other hand, every 
re-presenting is, in turn, couched in an impressional, inner consciousness; 
every conscious act is impressionally experienced. on the other, other 
hand (!), among such impressional experiences some are present as re-
presentations. We must juggle three demands: 1) all consciousness involves 
inner, impressional consciousness; 2) any consciousness has a possible, 
representifying modification that corresponds to it; and 3) impression 
and representation are mutually exclusive terms (hua XXiii, pp. 301-312). 
To clarify the stakes and theme, I find that in phantasy, for instance, I 
represent some event that is not really an event in my life. the phantasied 
event does not happen to me – it happens to a phantasied me. it is not a 
lived, impressional me but a modified me. I experience the act of phantasy 
and so it has a place in my stream of consciousness but it is present there 
as a foreigner. this is in stark contrast to perception, in which i fully 
identify with the one perceiving, where my experience of the perception 
is impressional through and through. it is doubtful that husserl was ever 
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fully satisfied with the analysis of inner consciousness in recollection. Upon 
recollecting, consciousness folds back upon itself, yielding an experience 
that is temporally structured not by one centre but by two poles (two 
‘nows’). This doubleness both defines and obscures my self-experience in 
remembering – a dual nature that is difficult to clarify. On this background, 
what can say about self-awareness in observer memories?
if we really attend to observer memories, what proves to be truly salient 
in them is not the shift of perspective noted by neisser and nigro, but 
rather something that they missed: the introduction of a new element, the 
inclusion of an objectified self. The event I present in an observer memory 
belongs to my past, but it could not have happened like that. there is a 
self-object in the memory, one that i identify with, but there are certain 
irresolvable discrepancies. For example: if i remember shovelling snow from 
an observer perspective it is possible that i see the surface of my eyes. yet, i 
could not have seen the surface of my eyes when i was outdoors in the snow.
Furthermore, it is misleading to say that one adopts a third-person 
perspective when having an observer memory. When i recollect myself 
shovelling, i recollect this self in front of me, at a certain distance and angle. 
Thus even my objectified self correlates to a zero point of orientation. The 
way that husserl conceives of the connection between perspective and 
the body is not at all straightforward. For husserl, even when i imagine a 
jabberwock it is given with an orientation to me – it is to the left of me, it is 
galumphing away from me. thus my experience of the imagined jabberwock 
with its profiles is also correlated to my perspective although in this case 
we cannot speak of real, localized eyes that are really seeing (hua iv, pp. 
55-58). therefore, observer memories cannot be characterized in terms of a 
shift of perspective but rather the constitution of a self-object that results in 
a complex awareness of perspectives. it is complex because not only is this 
self-object given to me in some form of memorial first-person perspective, 
i grasp this self-object precisely as something that has its own zero point of 
orientation. I apprehend my objectified self as having a certain perspective 
on the shovel.
There is no shift outside of the first-person perspective then. Our conceptual 
analysis based on intentionality finds that the common description of 
empirical-psychological research on observer memories errs where it says 
that observer memories are given in the third-person perspective. there is, 
however, a complex perspective due to the constitution of a self-object. With 
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respect to self-awareness or apperception in an observer memory we can 
say that it is: a) impressional because i experience it as really belonging to 
my past; b) representational because there are elements that i never really 
experienced; and most intriguing c) it is exteriorized4. the hard problem 
of self-awareness in observer memories is how to think the unity of the 
apperception of the remembering with its exteriorized self-awareness. in 
all recollection as such we implicitly present a lapsed self, who is removed 
from who we are now. The objectified self in an observer memory seems to 
give intuitive content to this sense of removal. the object-self in an observer 
memory is connected but not contiguous with my self now. it is me ‘out 
there’. An observer memory objectifies the self-alienation conditioned by 
changes over time.
I will close this section with a few hypotheses concerning the benefits 
of observer memories, guided by the question: what does the self-
object contribute to my conscious life? aside from lacking certain lived, 
first-person attributes, can we not say that such a self-representation 
accomplishes something that the field-memory does not? It might be the 
case that the objectified-self acts as a stand-in, an actor who plays me on the 
stage of my past. this actor can explore and experience things while i safely 
watch from my seat. i can represent events at a distance without being 
affected by them in the same way that reliving them would entail. From a 
clinical, pathological perspective, this self-object might be akin to deleuze 
& guattari’s (1991, pp. 60-81) personnage conceptuelle. Just as Zarathustra can 
tell me things that nietzsche cannot, just as the transcendental ego can 
experience things that Kant cannot, so my self-object can relive disturbing 
experiences i cannot. indeed, empirical research has shown that voluntarily 
changing recollections from field memories to observer memories decreases 
levels of affectivity (Robinson & Swanson 1993). It is precisely the benefit 
behind self-objectification that is difficult to explain in transcendental 
phenomenology. Why should i be psychologically vulnerable to my own 
past? Why should the transcendental ego feel any danger coming from 
its previous constitutional achievements? at any rate, there are also non-
pathological explanations of self-objectification. There is likely a link 
4   to admit both propositions a and b is tantamount to contradiction for husserl. this points to 
the need for a revision of the old distinctions within inner consciousness. the main task of this 
revision would be to avoid conceptual contradictions while respecting the tension that defines 
the experience of recollection, i.e. the tension between memory’s dreamlike nature and the 
way it presents events as ‘hard facts’ that have irrevocably and irreversibly passed. Perhaps the 
problem lies in husserl’s overly centrist conception of inner consciousness, which cannot handle 
heterogeneity. the path towards a reconciliation, then, lies in the direction of a more complex 
model that accounts for the way that, in remembering, consciousness doubles back on itself.
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to what cognitive psychologists call ‘verbal overshadowing’. When one 
recounts an experience again and again, the narrative elements of the story 
may start to seep into the recollection. there would be a story-self in the 
recollection of the original event – a strange mixture of the ‘i’ that a story-
character utters and the lived ‘i’. this calls for further empirical research.
i will restate my initial question: do observer memories pose a problem for 
husserl’s phenomenological account of recollection? i have argued that ob-
server memories do not break or even escape husserl’s account of recollec-
tion (i.e. they are not a salient counter-example). i hope also to have shown 
that husserl has provided us with the distinctions and concepts to produce 
knowledge about observer memories in phenomenological description. thus, 
rather than a proof against husserl’s philosophy of recollection, i believe the 
observer memory phenomenon makes a strong case for husserl’s founda-
tional insight that self-identity and pre-reflective self-consciousness are vi-
tal structuring elements of mnemic experience. What the observer memory 
does reveal, however, is that self-consciousness is ubiquitous yet evasive, 
moving on a spectrum from immediate, immanent self-identification to 
quasi-exterior-representation.
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